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Purpose- This paper presents empirical results exemplifying challenges related to information 
security faced by small and medium enterprises (SMEs). It uses guidelines based on work system 
theory (WST) to frame the results, thereby illustrating why the mere existence of corporate security 
policies or general security training often is insufficient for establishing and maintaining information 
security. 
Design/methodology/approach- This research was designed to produce a better appreciation and 
understanding of potential issues or gaps in security practices in SMEs. The research team 
interviewed 187 employees of 39 SMEs in the UK. All of those employees had access to sensitive 
information. Gathering information through interviews (instead of formal security documentation) 
made it possible to assess security practices from employees’ point of view. 
Findings- Corporate policies that highlight information security are often disconnected from actual 
work practices and routines and often do not receive high priority in everyday work practices. A vast 
majority of the interviewed employees are not involved in risk assessment or in the development of 
security practices. Security practices remain an illusory activity in their real world contexts. 
Research limitations/implications- This paper focuses only on closed-ended questions related to the 
following topics: a) awareness of existing security policy; b) information security practices and 
management and c) information security involvement. 
Practical implications- Our empirical findings show that corporate information security policies in 
SMEs often are insufficient for maintaining security unless those policies are integrated with visible 
and recognized work practices in work systems that use or produce sensitive information. Our 
interpretation based on WST provides guidelines for enhancing information system security. 
Originality/value- Beyond merely reporting empirical results, this research uses WST to interpret the 
results in a way that has direct implications for practitioners and for researchers. 
 
Keywords information security, security practices, work system theory, socio-technical approach, 
SMEs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Information system (IS) security is a challenge for all companies and government 
organizations ranging from the largest of the smallest. Our research looks at information 
security in SMEs, many of which are increasingly dependent on the use of information 
technologies and networked systems to support their business operations and decision- 
making processes. That dependence could make them especially vulnerable to IS security 
threats because of their limited human and technical resources and limited sophistication 
related to IS vulnerability issues. 
The UK has devoted substantial resources toward professional and governmental initiatives 
aimed at improving security in SMEs because SMEs contribute significantly to the UK 
economy and comprise the majority of businesses in every main industry sector (Home 
Office, 2017). For example, the national cyber-security strategy 2016-2021 comprises 
programmes and sets guidelines to help SMEs with developing and implementing preventive 
and deterrent security measures. 
Despite those programs, the cyber-security breaches survey 2018 (Cyber Security Breaches 
Survey, 2018) indicates that only 27% of businesses have a formal security policy in place 
and that most organisations are still unaware of major government cyber security initiatives 
and accreditation schemes. It is notable that investment in ongoing education and awareness 
programmes continues to expand. However, the effectiveness of training and awareness 
sessions is questionable as the number of staff-related security incidents continue to increase. 
A number of studies have outlined the inadequate impact of general training campaigns and 
generic security courses on user behaviour and awareness (e.g. Parsons et al., 2014). 
Our research emphasizes the centrality of human and organisational factors in information 
security. It focuses on the visibility and effectiveness of security practices as part of everyday 
work practices of typical employees. We argue that the adaptation of standardised security 
frameworks to real business practices requires an understanding of local work systems. The 
distinction between IS as a data processing system and IS as a human activity system points 
to potential gaps in matching security practices to organizational and business needs. Our 
results demonstrate that those issues are relevant and important to explore in information 
security research. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section identifies past research 
related to information security. Section three introduces work system theory (WST), a 
theoretical lens that provides many insights about information security even though it has not 
been used extensively in that area. Section three also provides information security guidelines 
that follow directly from the main ideas in WST. Section four summarizes the research 
context, the details of our data collection process, and the findings of our empirical study. 
Those findings illustrate important weaknesses in SME security practices. We use WST to 
explain the results by viewing security-related practices in the context of work systems whose 
participants give highest priority to meeting their assigned work responsibilities and lower 
priority or, in some cases, no priority to maintaining information security. We purposefully 
present the guidelines before the empirical results to help in visualising what these results tell 







Our literature review is organized around three main themes: socio-technical approach to 
information security, information security in organisational context and information security 
in SMEs. 
Overall, this literature review shows that information security is often viewed as an overlay 
on top of other tasks and responsibilities. It also shows that SMEs are not well represented in 
past research on information security. Much of that literature provides survey results or 
simply makes claims, but very little of it is presented in relation to a theoretical perspective 
that illuminates what the results mean and how to address the problems that are uncovered. 
2.1 Socio-technical approach to information security 
 
We focus on information security even though information security and computer security are 
intertwined. Siponen (2005) distinguishes between IS, software engineering, computer 
science and mathematics and associates different research communities with those 
disciplines. IS researchers use a variety of positivist ad interpretivist orientations, whereas 
most researchers in computer science and mathematics tend to have a positivist orientation. 
Irrespective of the separation between computer science and software engineering, the 
divergence between interpretivism vs. positivism is reflected in the coverage of security 
practices in IS research. Tryfonas et al. (2001) proposed an interpretive framework for 
expanding and incorporating security functions in the whole IS development. Coles-Kemp 
(2009) argues for a need to undertake more research on the complex relationships between 
human, organisational and technological aspects in information security. While challenging 
and time consuming, that type of exploration has potential to contribute to more effective 
information security management. A monolithic secure systems development methodology 
would be of limited value since information security functions depend on both human and 
infrastructural elements that should not be considered in isolation from each other. In 
particular, Coles-Kemp and Hansen (2017) argued that real-world everyday security 
problems must be seen as an emergent consequence of human activities, and separating social 
and technical strands is neither desirable nor advisable. That sociotechnical approaches and 
practices continue to be relevant in today’s world is made clear in discussions by several 
researchers (e.g. Berniker, 2016; Kowalski et al., 2019; Sarker et al., 2019). A contemporary 
interpretivist sociotechnical approach to information security requires a critically informed 
mindset (e.g. as described by Myers and Klein, 2011). This would potentially result in better 
understanding of the role and application of security functions in situated practices. 
 
 
2.2. Information security in organisational context 
 
The alignment between security and business processes needs is a long-standing issue in 
security management. A plethora of examples in the literature demonstrate that effective 
security measures must be established within a clear organisational context. Research has 
shown that an exclusive emphasis on a technology-centered view induces flaws in the design 
and implementation of security solutions and that inclusion of people and processes is 
essential as a core part of secure and usable work systems (Baskerville, 1991; Bednar and 
Katos, 2009; Siponen and Willison, 2009). One of the fundamental problems is balancing 
conflicting requirements of security and usability in the context of everyday priorities in real 
world work systems and job practices (Sommerville, 2011; Furnell, 2016; Dhillon et al., 
2016; Sasse and Smith, 2016). In this context, usability is not limited to technological 
features but also includes matters of efficiency, avoidance of distractions and convenience. 
Thus, security professionals should develop methods that minimise inconvenience and 
delays. 
Many examples show that the workforce often finds ways of working around security 
compliance or bypass security controls in order to do their work effectively. Woltjer (2017) 
argues that workarounds reflect a misalignment between information security and other work 
goals and result from a lack of awareness or understanding of working practices, which leads 
to new vulnerabilities. The empirical study by Caputo et al., (2016) shows that there is no 
single definition of the concept of usable security nor clear evaluation criteria of usability 
even within the same organisation. According to the same study, many developers of security 
functionalities show a patronising attitude towards target users and do not really understand 
the need to deliver usability. 
Conflicts between security and usability or convenience can be explained in many ways, one 
of which is inadequate or nonexistent involvement of professionals with operational 
knowledge of risk assessment and security policy development (Shedden et al., 2011; Spears 
and Barki, 2010). Business professionals’ individual, contextual understandings of their work 
roles need to be channeled into design practice if appropriate security measures are to be 
established. A critical analysis of a sample of security policies from the UK’s National 
Healthcare Service by Stahl et al., (2012) concluded that security policies can privilege 
certain groups of stakeholders such as managers and IT professionals and do not sufficiently 
integrate the views and concerns of doctors and nurses about medical matters. Inadequate 
staffing makes it even less likely that the existence of security policies will lead to effective 
implementation or relevance from users’ perspective (Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006). 
 
 
Albrechtsen and Hovden (2009) used the term “digital divide” to point out that there is a gap 
in knowledge and interests between security managers and users. In many cases, security 
professionals tend to focus on a model of business process, rather than on a real world 
organizational context. As a result, security practices often are developed independent of the 
needs of the surrounding human activity system. Information security methods that are 
disconnected from real world business practices often make it necessary for employees to 
breach security policies as the only way for them to do a good job (Albrechtsen, 2007; 
Koppel et al., 2015; Kolkowska and Dhillon, 2013; Adams and Sasse, 1999). 
Information security research has also focused on the need for proper communication of the 
relevance of security controls to employees who are involved in the implementation of those 
controls in everyday work practices (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2010; Karlesson et al., 2017). 
Applying network analysis techniques, Dang-Pham et al., (2016) showed the importance of 
identifying employees who are active in sharing security advice and security troubleshooting 
and involving them in security awareness programs. Such involvement has potential to 
support security engagement in the workplace. Hooper and McKissack (2016) question the 
technically-oriented job descriptions of CISO and suggest that CISOs should play a key role 
in matching security to business requirements. This entails both broad understanding of 
business processes supporting the delivery of value and strong communication skills need to 
work effectively with different groups of stakeholders including managers, business process 
owners and end-users. Ashenden and Sasse (2013) showed that CISOs often experience 
difficulties in communicating the why and how behind security measures and that there is 




2.3 Information security in SMEs 
 
Research on security practices in SMEs is limited, especially in relation to assessing security 
practices from employees’ point of view. While security practices vary by industry and 
company size, a key challenge for most SMEs is the integration of security functions into 
business processes. The comparative analysis of Dimopoulos et al., (2004) between two 
samples of SMEs in Europe and USA identified deficiencies in the main areas of security 
management practices, especially in a lack of engagement in developing security policies or 
undertaking risk assessments. These deficiencies were mainly attributed to insufficient 
technical and investment capacities to counter cyber-risks. 
In spite of political initiatives to support SMEs preparedness, gaps in SMEs security practices 
illustrate their weak understanding of how to implement and manage effective security 
controls and measures. The latest survey by the UK’s Department for Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sport found that organisations interviewed prefer advice and guidance that is tailored to 
their contexts and needs (Cyber Security Breaches Survey, 2018). When it comes to the 
impact of awareness campaigns, Cyber Security Breaches Survey (2019) showed that around 
a third of the participants do not know “how to act on the advice they have seen or heard 
around cyber security”. In the same vein, the empirical study by Renaud (2016) involving 
110 Scottish SMEs suggested that official bodies need to provide simple and easily 
understood advice to SMEs. That observation is consistent with ideas advocated by Mühe and 
Drechsler (2017). 
 
A key implication of the above literature is that data security processes cannot be built on 
models that ignore real world organizational behaviour or work practices. Although the 
importance of security education and training is obvious, focusing only on education and 
training does not address essential human aspects of security systems such as motivation and 
relevance to the work context. Beyond the technical systems, a frequent weak link is the 
difference between the formal models behavior and actual behavior that occurs in human 
activity systems that involve sensitive information. 
The work system approach discussed in the next section provides a systematic way of looking 
at information security as an integral part of the work that is being done. 
3. Work system theory as a lens for information security 
 
This section, which is based partly on Alter (2017), explains how work system theory (WST) 
can be used as a lens for visualizing and analyzing many information security issues. WST 
supports broad interpretations of empirical results in the next section that have direct 
implications for practitioners and researchers. 
Sociotechnical researchers have used the idea of work system for decades (e.g., Trist, 1981; 
Sinha and Van de Ven, 2005; Mumford, 2006). That term appeared in the first edition of MIS 
Quarterly (Bostrom and Heinen, 1977). More recently, it was used as the basis of the work 
system method (WSM), a systems analysis method developed over several decades to help 
business professionals understand and analyzing IT-reliant work systems in their own 
organizations. Students or student teams (mostly MBA and Executive MBA) used versions of 
WSM to produce over 700 management briefings recommending improvments of problematic 
IT-reliant WS during 2003-2017, mostly in their own organizations. For example, Truex et al. 
(2010; 2011) discusses results of 75 and later 301 of those assignments. The core ideas in 
WSM were articulated as WST in Alter (2013). Those ideas have been used in at least 10 
PhD theses, most recently Wong (2018), and have provided a usable systems perspective in 
research concerning topics such as open innovation platforms (Daiberl et al., 2019), 
crowdworking (Mrass and Peters, 2019), information exchange in health care (Johnsen et al., 
2016), transitions from product-centric to customer-centric services (Marjanovic and Murthy, 
2016), and alternative views of digitalization (Wolf et al., 2019). It also has formed the basis 
of WST extensions such as a theory of workarounds (Alter 2014) that has been applied to 
research related to information security (Jeon et al., 2018) 
A brief summary of WST introduces ideas that will be used to explain more about what the 
empirical findings mean in relation to both the operation of work systems and the iterative 
process by which work systems evolve over time. 
Work system. A work system is a system in which human participants and/or machines 
perform work (processes and activities) using information, technology, and other resources to 
produce specific product/services for specific internal and/or external customers (Alter, 
2013). Most significant work systems use IT extensively and can be described as IT-reliant. 
SMEs and other enterprises that grow beyond a largely improvised start-up phase can be 
viewed as operating based on the internal activities and interactions of multiple work 
systems. For example, typical SMEs contain work systems that procure materials from 
suppliers, produce product/services, deliver product/services, find customers, create financial 
reports, hire employees, coordinate work across departments, and perform many other 
functions. The definition of work system includes the phrase “human participants and/or 
machines perform work” because work systems may be sociotechnical systems with human 
participants or may be totally automated. 
Work system theory. A complete understanding of a work system needs to include both a 
static view of a work system during a period when it is relatively stable and a dynamic view 
of how a work system changes over time. WST (Alter 2013) distils the core of that 
understanding into three components, the definition of work system (above) and two 
frameworks. The work system framework (Figure 1) is a pictorial representation of a work 
system in terms of nine elements included in a basic understanding of its form, function, and 
environment during a period when it is relatively stable. A work system’s identity remains 
unchanged during such periods of stability even though incremental changes such as minor 
personnel substitutions or technology upgrades may occur within what is still considered the 
same version of the same work system. The work system life cycle (WSLC) model (Figure 2) 
is a pictorial representation of the iterative process by which work systems evolve over time 
through a combination of planned change (formal projects) and unplanned change that occurs 
through adaptations and workarounds (see Alter, 2014). 
Tables 1 and 2 show that the elements of the work system framework and the phases of the 
WSLC have many direct implications related to information security. 
Work system framework. Figure 1 outlines elements of even a rudimentary understanding a 
work system’s form, function, and environment. Figure 1 places the customer on top because 
work systems exist for the purpose producing product/services for customers. This leads to 
inherent trade-offs between internal management concerns about performing the work 
efficiently, maintaining participant morale, and minimizing vulnerability to threats, versus 
customer concerns about the total cost, quality, and other characteristics of the 
product/services that they receive. Notice how this system view of work implies that time and 




Figure 1. Work System Framework (Alter, 2006, 2013) 
 
 
Work system life cycle model. Work systems are assumed to evolve over time through a 
combination of planned change and unplanned (emergent) change. Those changes involve not 
only changes in hardware and software, but also changes in all other components of a work 
system. The WSLC (Figure 2) represents planned change as projects that include initiation, 
development, and implementation phases. Initiation is the chartering of a project whose goal 
is to create or improve a work system. Development involves creation or acquisition of 
resources required for implementation of desired changes in the organization. In the WSLC 
implementation of a sociotechnical work system refers to implementation in the organization, 
not implementation of algorithms on computers. A full iteration from one operation and 
maintenance phase to the next operation and maintenance phase might be viewed as a 
transition from a previous version of the work system to a subsequent version. Figure 2 
represents unplanned change in the WSLC using inward-facing arrows that represent ongoing 
adaptations, bricolage, and workarounds that change aspects of the current work system 
without separate allocation of significant project resources. 
The WSLC is not meant as a rigorous specification of a precise process by which work 
systems evolve over time. Instead, it summarizes how work systems evolve over time in an 
iterative manner, noting that planned and unplanned changes are part of the story, that 
planned change occurs through projects to which resources are assigned, and that unplanned 
change may occur in a variety of ways. 
 
 
Figure 2. The Work System Life Cycle Model 
 
 
3.1 Implications of the work system framework for information security practices 
 
Each of the nine elements of the work system framework (Figure 1) can be a locus or source 
of an information vulnerability for almost any significant work system, including work 
systems that might focus on design, sales, manufacturing, HR, finance, and so on. Table 1 
shows several typical information security guidelines related to each of the nine elements. 
Each of the guidelines can be restated as a question that can be raised during the analysis and 
design of information systems and the work systems that they support (see typical questions 
in Alter, 2017). The guidelines themselves do not seem remarkable and could be improved in 
various ways. The point here is not their uniqueness, but rather that the elements provide an 
organized way to identify and visualize frequently important issues related to information 
security in the context of work systems through which SMEs and other enterprises operate. 
Comparison between these guidelines and the empirical results reported in Figures 3, 4, and 5 
illuminates a key generalization: many SMEs do not follow these straightforward guidelines 
and may not be aware of them or similar guidelines. 
Element of the 
work system 
framework 
Typical information security guidelines 
Customers  Significant information that is transferred to or accessed by 
customers should be protected from inappropriate use by customers 
or by anyone associated with customers, such as their employees, 
contractors, customers, and suppliers. 
 Information about customers should be checked for accuracy and 
protected from inappropriate use. 
Product/services  Informational product/services should be designed and produced in 
ways that minimize vulnerability to error or misuse. 
 Incentives for misstating or otherwise corrupting information 




 Security/ vulnerability – related weaknesses in a work system’s 
processes and activities should be identified and minimized. 
 Processes and activities should operate in a way that encourages 
consistency with corporate information security policies. 
 Processes and activities should be monitored to identify practices 
that ignore or contradict established security guidelines or are risky 
in other ways. 
 Processes and activities should be designed in a way that does not 
force work system participants to choose between meeting 
performance goals and conforming with information security 
guidelines. 
 Workarounds and other shortcuts that increase security 
vulnerabilities should be identified and minimized. 
Participants  Work system participants should be fully aware of information 
security guidelines and the vulnerabilities that result when those 
guidelines are not followed. 
 They should receive training or other clear communication that 
helps them appreciate the negative impacts of security incidents. 
 Incentives for work system participants should be aligned with 
requirements for information security and should not encourage 
participants to ignore or work around those guidelines. 
Information  Sensitive information should be identified. 
 Information protection should be aligned with the sensitivity of 
specific information. 
 Information security mechanisms should not be so onerous and 
time-consuming that they invite workarounds. 
Technologies  Technologies in a work system should be protected from IS security 
risks related to intrusion, theft, sabotage, or other issues that 
conflict with information security. 
 Technologies should be monitored to identify non-standard 
operation, non-standard usage, and other conditions that could 
compromise information security 
Environment  The existence of enterprise policies related to information security 
does not imply that those policies will be followed or even that 
those policies will be known by many work system participants. 
  The relevant environment should be monitored for information 
security threats. 
Infrastructure  Shared technical and informational infrastructure may bring 
vulnerabilities related to information security. 
 Enterprise infrastructure should be monitored to identify possible 
sources of security risk. Infrastructure and infrastructure usage 
should be designed to minimize such risks. 
Strategies  Work systems should have appropriate strategies related to 
information security. 
 Any inconsistencies between a work system’s security strategy and 
enterprise guidelines related to information security should be 
examined for related benefits and problems. 
Table 1. Typical Security Guidelines Related to Elements of the Work System Framework 
 
 
3.2 Implications of the work system life cycle model for information security practices 
 
Table 2 identifies typical information security guidelines related to the three planned change 
phases of the WSLC (Figure 2), initiation, development, and implementation. The operation 
and maintenance phase of the WSLC is covered by Table 1, which presents information 
security guidelines for the various elements of the work system framework. As with the 
guidelines in Table 1, each of the guidelines in Table 2 can be restated as a question that can 
be raised during the analysis and design of information systems and the work systems that 
they support. As with Table 1, the point here is not about the uniqueness of the ideas related 
to the phases, but rather that the phases provide an organized way to identify and visualize 
frequently important issues. 
 
Phase of the 
WSLC 
Typical information security guidelines 
Initiation  Information security should be considered in the initiation phase for 
any work system project that touches sensitive information. 
 Where information is sensitive, information security requirements 
should be mentioned in specification documents, user stories, or 
other indications of the project’s scope or goals. 
 Resources should be allocated for security-related features, 
activities, and training. 
Development  Development projects that create or update software should devote 
appropriate attention to information security, even in projects that 
apply agile methods. 
 Appropriate attention to information security should be explicit in 
outputs of the development phase including new or updated 
software, documentation and training materials. 
Implementation  The implementation phase should devote sufficient time and energy 
to information security in the new or improved work system. 
  The implementation process should assure that work system 
participants fully appreciate foreseeable security vulnerabilities and 
the types of actions and attitudes needed to minimize those 
vulnerabilities. For example, they should understand expectations 
related to transferring data to personal devices, using passwords or 
other authentication schemes, and logging off when sessions end. 
Operation and 
Maintenace 
This phase is covered in Table 1, which identifies typical 
information security guidelines for work systems in operation. 




4. Empirical study of information security in SMEs 
 
The empirical study involved 187 employees from 39 SMEs situated in the region of 
Hampshire in the UK. The research was carried out by 39 trainee business analysts (research 
students) involved in a business analysis project and the lead investigator (a senior academic) 
was one of the authors of this paper. Each trainee selected the company they collaborated 
with. Those companies were drawn from a variety of sectors, including manufacturing 
industry, services and retail. Company size varied from 5 to 250 employees. In each SME, 
the analyst held approximately ten (or more) semi-structured individual interviews over a 
period of six months. Interviews took around half an hour and had a specified theme and 
focus. One of the interview sessions was used for a walk-through of the information security 
questionnaire which was used to support the interviews. The main objective of our 
exploration was to assess security practices from employees’ point of view and not just as 
described in formal security documentation. This approach led to a better appreciation and 
understanding of issues and gaps in security practices. The questionnaire was divided into 
five sections based partly on the SME questionnaire and guidelines within the Government’s 
National Cyber Security Programme. It also covered additional topics related to human and 
organizational factors in information security management. The questionnaire also included 
questions that could be answered by professional employees who might or might not have an 
IT background. The first three parts of the questionnaire focused on planning, 
implementation, and review of information security. The fourth part focused on information 
security management. The fifth dealt with the contribution of employees to information 
security management activities. The latter section of the questionnaire is of particular interest 
for this paper’s goals as it investigates the extent to which companies integrate information 
security activities in every day working routines. This is explored through employees’ 
perceptions of the extent to which that integration exists. 
The interviewees were all employees who, according to their own description, handle 
sensitive data, and therefore should take security considerations into account while doing 
their jobs. The study took place over a six-month period between September 2017 and March 
2018. In most companies, three to five employees were interviewed. Most of the questions 
were closed-ended but a few included an opportunity for interviewees to provide further 
explanation. All the questions were discussed during the interviews. 
The resulting data was analysed by the authors of this paper, which draws mainly on the 
outcome and discussions of closed-ended questions related to the following topics: a) 
awareness of security policy; b) information security practices and management and c) 
information security involvement. The guidelines from Section 3 based on the work system 
framework and WSLC provide a perspective about what we should have found if the SMEs 
took information security seriously. Unfortunately, those guidelines point to many aspects of 
information security awareness and practices that were missing in many of the SMEs. 
This study was part of a larger ongoing academic research project which started more than 
ten years ago. The main project is a an action research project that tries to help SMEs develop 
a better understanding of their work systems and their potential for change. All participating 
organizations gave their written consent (in a specific contract of agreement) before the 
analysis of the interview data began. Additionally, all participating employees each gave 
separate consent in writing during individual face to face meetings before any further 
discussions took place. Each individual organization received a full (anonymized) report of 
the analysis for their particular organization. Each part of the analysis and dataset was 
validated during the inquiry process. The validation involved collaboration between 
researchers and interviewees in reviewing all documents, discussions, and models related to a 
company’s information security training, expectations, and practices. Documents discussed 





4.1 Awareness of security policy 
 
We were surprised to find that that almost half (48%) of the interviewees were not aware of 
existing security controls and that a quarter of the respondents did not know or apply a formal 
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How would you describe a future information security policy within your 
organisation? 
48 
security policy. As shown in Figure 3, 11% said they did not follow any security policy 
guidelines and 26% reported that any existing security policy was informal. Only 38% of the 
interviewees who responded to this question reported that a formal security policy had been 
established or was being developed. This result illustrates the difference between awareness 
of security policies and the possible existence of security policies. Even in cases where 
employees were not aware of the policies, it is possible that their employers had defined 
security policies or had implemented security controls. A related study by Balozian and 
Leidner (2016) recommends that security professionals need to make an extra effort to justify 
the relevance of a security policy from a practitioner’s point of view. 
 
 




4.2 Information security practices and management 
 
As shown in Figure 4, a significant number of interviewees recommend that a clearly 
identified individual should be the responsible for information and cyber security. In addition, 
45% of the respondents suggested that a permanent incident security response team was 
needed and 48% thought that it is necessary to clarify responsibility for data ownership and 
protection within their companies. These findings demonstrate a real need within the SMEs to 
improve their reporting mechanisms related to security risks in order to identify early signs of 
risks and to respond to them more effectively. Figure 4 also shows that 51% of the 
respondents reported that their companies are not reviewing or testing the effectiveness of 
security controls and 22% are not aware of any update of such controls. This is an alarming 
32% 23% 45% Series1 




result given the dynamic nature of security risks and the necessity of developing proactive 
approaches to information security. 
 
Is your company reviewing and 
testing the effectiveness of its IS 
Security and Cyber Security controls 
and practices? 
Should your organization have a 
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4.3 Information security involvement 
 
The interview results indicated a clear gap between security requirements and security 
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Figure 5: Information security involvement 
 
Another interesting finding is the discrepancy between information security considerations as 
a requirement of the job and information security as a priority for doing the job. While all the 
interviewees handle sensitive data to do their job 53% said their job does not require careful 
attention to data security. Interestingly, 60% of the interviewed employees stated that 
information security is not prioritised when doing their job. With regards to staff training, 
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Yes No 
Percentage 40% 60% 
 
52% of survey respondents said they did not get any training or advice in good information 
security practices. That finding is consistent with the work system framework’s implication 
that work system participants typically give much higher priority to performing their assigned 
tasks within the work system than to following information security guidelines. 
These results indicate serious deficiencies in the security practices of the SMEs in our 
sample. While security practices vary by industry and company size, we believe our sample 
was broad enough to be representative of SMEs in the UK. Our clear conclusion is that most 
SMEs face challenges related to the integration of security function into work processes and 
in many cases may not be aware of the extent and significance of those challenges. Despite of 
political initiatives to support SMEs preparedness, the observed gaps in SMEs security 
practices illustrate their weak understanding of how to implement and manage effective 
security controls and measures. Our findings also support the conclusion that security 
practices must be influenced by those employees who are affected by the deployment of 
security controls in their own work practices. If decisions on security practices remain solely 
within the domain of security experts, we should expect that those decisions will not be 






Our exploratory research study reveals that security practices of many SMEs do not go far 
enough in recognising the importance of effective information security management. Even 
when security is considered important in an SME, it may not receive high priority in the 
context of everyday work practices. While all of the interviewed employees handle and use 
sensitive data to do their jobs, a vast majority are not involved in risk assessment or in the 
development of security practices. Security practices are not prioritised and remain an 
illusory activity in their real world working contexts. Our empirical study indicates that actual 
work practices and routines of most employees were often ignored in the development and 
operation of security management efforts. Moreover, security processes that are designed 
outside of the real world organizational context are prone to undermine effective 
organizational practices and to create unintended consequences in the operation of work 
systems. These key findings are consistent with previous literature discussed in the second 
section. 
One of the main limitations of this study is its reliance on closed-ended questions. In future 
research, we hope to expand upon the questions explored here. We hope to embark on a 
series of in-depth interviews with selected respondents in order to obtain a richer 
understanding of their security practices. A further analysis of collected data according to 
company size or activity sector is also desirable. 
The empirical results show that many SMEs do not follow typical information security 
guidelines such as those shown in Tables 1 and 2. Those guidelines are organized around the 
central ideas in WST. The direct relevance of those guidelines to our empirical findings 
implies that a work system perspective might provide a coherent container for describing, 
analysing, and evaluating situations related to IS security and for studying IS security as a 
research endeavour (Alter, 2017). 
The challenge of introducing security in an effective and useful manner can be addressed by 
considering the nine elements within the work system framework in order to streamline risk 
management processes, involve relevant stakeholders in operational security risks mitigation 
and set up well-targeted security awareness and training programmes. This means that 
information security should not be seen as an add-on, but rather should be integrated into 
work system design efforts and into changes in work practices. We found major disconnects 
between straightforward guidelines about information security (Section 3) and actual security 
related practices (Section 4). Providing guidelines couched in a work system perspective 
could be a practical way to explain that security needs to be taken more seriously. At 
minimum, SME managers and workers should recognize that security guidelines need to be 
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